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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici curiae are scholars and practitioners of 
legal and judicial ethics, and legal ethics centers, 
affiliated with various institutions or universities 
throughout the United States (“Ethics Amici”).  
Ethics Amici have extensive experience analyzing,  
studying, teaching and engaging in scholarship 
regarding the regulation of the bench and bar, 
including the norms of judicial conduct and the 
processes for formulating, interpreting and applying 
standards of judicial conduct. 
This case implicates the interests of Ethics Amici 
because it involves the standards of judicial conduct 
and the extent of judicial authority to formulate and 
apply standards of judicial conduct in criminal cases 
to promote the independence, integrity, and 
impartiality of the judicial system and the fair 
administration of justice.  Ethics Amici submit this 
brief to underscore a federal appellate court’s 
supervisory authority to regulate federal trial judges’ 
pretrial conduct in criminal proceedings when that 
conduct—encouraging the criminal defendant to 
plead guilty and cooperate with the government—is 
coercive and departs from the judge’s role as neutral 
judicial officer, thereby undermining the fairness of 
proceedings and the integrity of the judicial process.  
                                                 
1  Pursuant to Rule 37.3(a), amici curiae affirm that all 
parties have consented in writing to the filing of this amici 
curiae brief.  Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici curiae affirm that no 
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no person or entity other than amici curiae or counsel for amici 
curiae made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves the propriety of a magistrate 
judge’s comments to a criminal defendant regarding 
the advisability of entering a guilty plea and 
cooperating with the Government.  From the 
inception of the criminal proceedings in the Southern 
District of Georgia, Respondent Anthony Davila 
(“Davila”) expressed displeasure about his court-
appointed attorney, including his advice to plead 
guilty, as well as reservations and confusion about 
the proposed plea agreement, including its possible 
collateral effect on other criminal proceedings in the 
Middle District of Florida.  See J.A. 154-55 (Feb. 8, 
2010 ex parte hearing); J.A. 96-98, 114 (May 17, 2010 
Rule 11/Change of Plea hearing); J.A. 59-60, 63-64 
(Nov. 15, 2010 motions and sentencing hearing).  
Accordingly, Davila sent a letter to the court 
requesting different counsel.  J.A. 146.  He 
complained that his counsel had communicated that 
Davila’s only option was “to plead guilty.”   J.A. 152.   
Davila’s letter prompted the magistrate judge to 
hold an ex parte hearing with Davila and his defense 
counsel.   J.A. 146.  At the outset, the magistrate 
judge informed Davila that the court would address 
Davila’s letter requesting different counsel, but 
Davila should “[m]ake sure [he] underst[oo]d that” 
the appointed counsel, Mr. Loebl, was “the only court 
appointed attorney [he] [was] going to get.”  J.A. 148.   
The magistrate judge said that Mr. Loebl “was 
one of the finest law clerks” the magistrate judge had 
ever had and that Davila was “lucky” to have him as 
his attorney, and communicated that his only options 
were to keep Mr. Loebl or proceed pro se.  J.A. 147-
48.  He referred to another defendant he had 
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“begged” not to proceed pro se, who received a life 
sentence without parole after representing himself at 
trial.  J.A. 148.  The magistrate judge said Davila 
could “be just like that guy” if he chose to proceed 
without his court-appointed attorney.  J.A. 148.   
At that point in the ex parte hearing, the 
magistrate judge went beyond denying Davila’s 
request for new counsel out of hand, and addressed 
the wisdom of the court-appointed attorney’s advice 
to plead guilty and cooperate with the Government.   
Those comments are at the heart of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision and the question presented to this 
Court, and are analyzed by Ethics Amici in the 
Argument section of this brief at I.A and I.B.  As the 
hearing concluded, Davila said that he would proceed 
with his appointed counsel rather than pro se 
“because [he] [was] on medication so there [was] no 
way [he] could represent [himself].”  J.A. 159.   
Following the ex parte hearing, and after plea 
negotiations became active, Davila signed a plea 
agreement and subsequently entered his guilty plea 
before a district judge.  J.A. 81-144.  At the 
proceeding during the colloquy, Davila, although he 
was represented by counsel, raised “a couple of 
inaccuracies” as to the timing and nature of his 
conspiracy charge in the indictment.  J.A. 96.  
Specifically, the indictment indicated that the 
conspiracy lasted from 2005 until 2007, while Davila 
alleged that any conduct on his part did not begin 
until 2006.   J.A. 96.  Also, the indictment alleged 
that Davila impersonated a law clerk to obtain public 
information from court files, which Davila alleged 
was incorrect.  J.A. 96-97.  At this point, Mr. Loebl 
stepped in and assured the court that Davila 
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admitted that his conduct met the elements of the 
crime charged.  J.A. 99.  The court instructed the 
Government to call the special agent who 
investigated the crime as a witness to ensure that “a 
factual basis exist[ed] to support [the] the guilty plea 
and conviction.”  J.A. 99-100.  The agent agreed that 
Davila did not know the co-conspirator at issue until 
2006, but alleged that the time span referred to the 
tax years for which false returns were submitted.  
J.A. 109-10.  After the special agent testified, Davila 
again raised that while he admitted to the special 
agent’s testimony, “there were some inaccuracies in 
the indictment that [we]re relevant to [his] conduct” 
and to his sentencing.  J.A. 114.  When asked, Davila 
testified that he was entering into the plea 
voluntarily, J.A. 122, and the district judge found as 
much on the record.  J.A. 123. 
After the plea, but before sentencing, the 
magistrate judge granted Davila permission to 
proceed pro se and appointed Mr. Loebl as stand-by 
counsel.  J.A. 57.  Davila, at that point proceeding pro 
se, moved to vacate his plea and dismiss the 
indictment.   J.A. 56-59.   
At the motions and sentencing hearing, the 
district judge addressed the motions to vacate the 
plea and dismiss the indictment.  J.A. 56-57.  Davila 
argued pro se—with the same Mr. Loebl assigned as 
standby counsel.  J.A. 56-57.  This left Davila 
effectively without a disinterested advocate to assist 
him at that time in articulating a basis for vacating 
the plea due to coercion to plead guilty that occurred 
at the ex parte hearing.  Davila argued that the 
indictment contained erroneous facts and that these 
facts would affect the criminal proceedings in the 
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Middle District of Florida.  J.A. 59.  Davila explained 
to the district judge that he had raised this issue at 
the change of plea hearing before he entered his 
guilty plea, see J.A. 96-98, and various times with his 
attorney.  J.A. 61-63 (“When I read to the Court at 
the Change of Plea hearing and I talked about the 
inaccurate timeframes, nobody said anything about 
it.  Nobody said anything about what is going on with 
these timeframes.  I read it to the Court at the 
Change of Plea hearing.  I was telling the Court, at 
that point in time, that there was something wrong 
with the timeframes.”).   
Davila expressed that he “was misinformed by [] 
counsel” and that he would never have entered into 
the plea if he had been told the effect it would have 
on the pending prosecution in the Middle District of 
Florida.  J.A. 62-64 (“I’m trying to say he assured me 
that everything was going to be fine. But what 
happened was now I’m exposed to substantive 
offenses in the Middle District of Florida based on 
those false statements.”).   
When the district judge asked Davila to articulate 
a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea, using 
the language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(d)(2)(B), the standard for vacating a guilty plea if 
raised after the plea is entered, but before 
sentencing, Davila again referred to the 
misunderstanding about the plea agreement.  Davila 
referenced his counsel, not the magistrate judge, but 
again referred to misinformation and confusion about 
the plea agreement and its effect on collateral 
proceedings, and that he would not have entered the 
plea if he had understood the effect of the very 
cooperation that the magistrate judge appeared to be 
6 
 
  
urging.  J.A. 64-65 (“Please, I urge the Court to 
understand that. It was based on misinformation. 
Had I known -- had I known that it was going to 
effect [sic] me substantively in the Middle District of 
Florida, I would have never taken that plea, your 
Honor.); see also J.A. 62-65. 
The court denied Davila’s pro se motions to vacate 
the plea and dismiss the indictment, finding no fair 
and just reason to permit Davila to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  J.A. 72.  The court then sentenced Davila 
to 115 months in prison.  J.A. 77-78.  
On appeal, Mr. Loebl was appointed to represent 
Davila, but filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on 
the basis that no nonfrivolous grounds existed.  Case 
No. 10-1583, Nos. 26 & 27.  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied that 
motion, stating its “independent review ha[d] 
revealed an irregularity in the statements of the 
magistrate judge, made during a hearing prior to 
Davila’s plea, which appeared to urge Davila to 
cooperate and be candid about his criminal conduct to 
obtain favorable sentencing consequences.”  Doc. No. 
31.  The Eleventh Circuit then vacated the 
conviction, holding that the magistrate judge’s 
comments amounted to improper judicial 
participation in plea negotiations, and remanded the 
case with instructions that it be assigned to a 
different district judge.  United States v. Davila, 664 
F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2011).  The Eleventh Circuit 
reasoned that the participation constituted plain 
error and that Davila need not show actual prejudice.  
Id. at 1358-59. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I.  The magistrate judge’s comments about the 
advisability of a guilty plea, and urging the 
defendant to “go to the cross” and “tell it all” to 
cooperate with the Government, made worse by the 
introduction of religious imagery, were coercive.  The 
magistrate judge abandoned the proper judicial role 
as neutral arbiter, and instead adopted the role of 
advocate or legal counselor to the defendant.  The 
coercive effect of such comments, from a judge, is 
likely to be overwhelming, and, if uncorrected, 
eliminates any assurance that a subsequent guilty 
plea was voluntary.  Even well-intentioned judicial 
comments urging a plea or cooperation are inherently 
coercive and violate canons, rules, and standards of 
judicial ethics.  Jurisdictions that allow judges to 
play some part in plea negotiations hold that judges 
must not abandon the judicial role and make 
comments that suggest a partisan attitude about the 
case or the defendant, nor communicate that a plea 
agreement should be accepted or a guilty plea 
entered.  Irrespective of whether the magistrate 
judge’s comments actually influenced Davila to plead 
guilty here, judicial exhortations to plead guilty 
damage the integrity of the judiciary and criminal 
justice system in addition to fundamentally 
impairing the voluntariness of a plea and a 
defendant’s right to a fair process.   
II.  The Eleventh Circuit had supervisory 
authority to vacate the guilty plea here based on the 
magistrate judge’s departure from the judicial role.  
Indeed, a federal appellate court’s supervisory 
authority is at its zenith when exercised over the 
judiciary, such as to ensure the fair administration of 
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criminal justice.  Courts may exercise supervisory 
authority not just to protect individual rights, but 
also to protect judicial integrity and to promote 
confidence in the just administration of justice.  On 
this record, no additional inquiry into actual coercion 
or prejudice is required or desirable.  Whether or not 
the magistrate judge’s conduct also violated Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1), the record is 
sufficient to show inherently prejudicial, coercive 
judicial conduct that courts may remedy.   
ARGUMENT 
I. THE  MAGISTRATE  JUDGE’S  ADVICE  TO 
PLEAD  GUILTY  AND  COOPERATE—
INCLUDING  TWICE  URGING  DAVILA  TO 
GO  OR  COME “TO THE CROSS”—WAS 
COERCIVE  AND  A  DEPARTURE  FROM  THE 
NEUTRAL  JUDICIAL  ROLE. 
A. The Comments Violated Judicial Standards Of 
Conduct And Undermined The Voluntariness 
Of  The  Plea  And  The  Fairness  Of  The 
Proceedings. 
Judicial exhortations to plead guilty and 
cooperate with the Government, such as the 
magistrate judge’s comments here, undermine the 
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary and the 
fair administration of justice, as well as the 
voluntariness of a defendant’s guilty plea.   A judge 
should not through word or demeanor communicate 
to a criminal defendant that a plea agreement should 
be accepted or that a guilty plea should be entered.  
Such coercive judicial participation in a defendant’s 
decision to plead guilty and cooperate—in the context 
of plea negotiations or outside of that context—
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undermines the integrity of, and public confidence in, 
the judiciary and the fair administration of justice.   
Here, at an ex parte hearing held by the 
magistrate judge to address concerns raised by 
Davila about his court-appointed attorney, the 
magistrate judge went far beyond ruling on the 
request for new counsel, and made comments urging 
the advisability of a guilty plea and cooperation with 
the Government that were coercive.  Davila’s 
attorney never objected to the magistrate judge’s 
comments, and perhaps not surprisingly, since the 
magistrate judge was endorsing that attorney’s 
advice to plead guilty. Thereafter, the magistrate 
judge’s comments also went unaddressed and 
uncorrected by the magistrate judge and the district 
judge before Davila’s guilty plea, before the motion to 
vacate the guilty plea, and before sentencing.  Those 
comments—whether well-intentioned or not—
undermined the voluntariness of the guilty plea and 
the fairness of the criminal proceedings. 
Specifically, in response to Davila’s expressed 
concerns about his counsel’s failure to propose a 
defense apart from pleading guilty, and that his 
defense counsel “thinks [Davila] ought to plead 
guilty,” the magistrate judge responded that 
“oftentimes” that is the “best advice” that a lawyer 
can give his client.  J.A. 152.  The magistrate judge 
opined that, in view of the Government’s evidence, it 
might be “a good idea” for a defendant to plead guilty 
and “not wast[e] the Court’s time” and “not caus[e] 
the Government to have to spend a bunch of money 
empanelling a jury to try an open and shut case.”  
J.A. 152-53.  Davila stated that “all [he] wanted was 
[his] options” and that his counsel had never 
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explained that Davila had any choice but to accept 
the plea agreement proposed by the Government.  
J.A. 154.  Davila said that not one of his 
communications from defense counsel addressed “a 
viable defense at all except for pleading guilty.”  J.A. 
155.  The magistrate judge responded “[w]ell there 
may not be a viable defense to these charges.”  J.A. 
155.  Additionally, the magistrate judge commented 
that Mr. Loebl had done his best to assist Davila, 
“which is far better than many other attorneys would 
have done on your behalf.”  J.A. 158.  Although 
framed, at times, as hypothetical statements, the 
comments were made in direct response to Davila 
questioning his defense counsel’s advice to plead 
guilty in his case.  They created the clear impression, 
taken as a whole, that the magistrate judge was 
endorsing that advice. 
The magistrate judge further crossed the line 
when discussing the possibility of the Government 
filing a motion for downward departure pursuant to 
United States Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 5K.1.1.  He went far beyond explaining its 
effect, and again urged Davila not only to plead 
guilty, but to provide potentially incriminating 
information to the Government.  Those comments 
included strongly worded advice to Davila that the 
Government “ha[s] all of the marbles” and Davila had 
to “go to the cross” and “tell . . . everything [he] did in 
this case regardless of how bad it makes you appear”:    
 
THE COURT:  . . . .  The only thing at 
your disposal that is entirely up to you is 
the two or three level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility.  That means 
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you’ve got to go to the cross.  You’ve got to 
tell the probation officer everything you 
did in this case regardless of how bad it 
makes you appear to be because that is 
the way you get that three-level reduction 
for acceptance, and believe me, 
Mr. Davila, someone with your criminal 
history needs a three-level reduction for 
acceptance. . . .  In order to get the 
reduction for acceptance, you’ve got to 
come to the cross.  You’ve got to go there 
and you’ve got to tell it all, Brother, and 
convince that probation officer that you 
are being as open and honest with him as 
you can possibly be because then he will 
go to the district judge and he will say, 
you know, that Davila guy, he’s got a long 
criminal history but when we were in 
there talking about this case he gave it all 
up so give him the two-level, give him the 
three-level reduction. 
J.A. 159-61.   
By encouraging Davila to plead guilty and 
cooperate, the court not only inserted itself into the 
plea negotiations, violating Rule 11(c)(1), but also 
abandoned its judicial role as neutral arbiter.  The 
magistrate judge took on the role of partisan or 
counselor by reinforcing the advice given by Davila’s 
defense counsel, whom Davila was challenging.   It is 
a gross departure from the judicial role for a judge to 
advocate that a defendant waive his constitutional 
rights.   
The magistrate judge’s encouragement to enter a 
guilty plea was coercive.  The magistrate judge put 
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the credibility and authority of the bench behind 
defense counsel’s advice to plead guilty.  At that 
point, a guilty plea effectively appeared to be Davila’s 
only option to reduce his sentence, in the stated view 
of the court.  See J.A. 159-60.  It is natural to imagine 
that Davila already may have felt pressure from his 
defense counsel to plead guilty and cooperate with 
the Government.  That pressure would only have 
been heightened by the more influential impression 
that the magistrate judge agreed with defense 
counsel.  See United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 
560, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (“The realities of human 
nature and common experience compel the conclusion 
that the defendant was enveloped by a coercive force 
resulting from the knowledge conveyed to him of the 
Court’s attitude as to sentence which, under all the 
circumstances, foreclosed a reasoned choice by him at 
the time he entered his plea of guilty.”). 
Not only that, invoking Christian religious 
imagery about guilt and penitence—“you’ve got to 
come to the cross” and “tell it all”—to urge pleading 
guilty and cooperating with the Government 
contributed to the coercive nature of the comments.  
See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 388 (1977) 
(determining that police officer’s “Christian burial 
speech” constituted interrogation such that defendant 
was entitled to assistance of counsel); see also United 
States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740-41 (4th Cir. 
1991) (vacating sentence where sentencing judge 
violated due process by referencing religious beliefs 
at sentencing; “[o]ur Constitution, of course, does not 
require a person to surrender his or her religious 
beliefs upon the assumption of judicial office” but 
“[c]ourts, however, cannot sanction sentencing 
procedures that create the perception of the bench as 
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a pulpit from which judges announce their personal 
sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish 
defendants for offending it.”)2   
 The court abandoned the role of neutral again, 
and also exerted pressure to plead guilty, by 
expressing the magistrate judge’s opinion that Davila 
had no chance of succeeding if he chose to represent 
himself.  See J.A. 157 (commenting that “[i]t would be 
an act of sheer lunacy” for Davila to proceed pro se).  
Those comments suggested that Davila essentially 
had no choice but to keep his current counsel and 
take the court and counsel’s advice to plead guilty, or 
he would have no chance of a successful outcome.  
The magistrate judge’s comments about Davila’s 
criminal history, such as that Davila is “no babe in 
the woods” with regard to the criminal justice system, 
J.A. 157-58; see also J.A. 160 (“and believe me, 
Mr. Davila, someone with your criminal history needs 
                                                 
2 In Bakker, the Fourth Circuit stated that “[w]hether or not 
the trial judge has a religion is irrelevant for purposes of 
sentencing,” but “the apprehension that . . . a lengthy prison 
term [t]here may have reflected the fact that the court’s own 
sense of religious propriety had somehow been betrayed” 
constituted an abuse of discretion requiring the sentence 
vacated and the case assigned to a different district judge.  Id. 
at 740-41; see also North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal 
Found. v. Constangy,  947 F.2d 1145, 1150-52 (4th Cir. 1991) (in 
establishment clause context, holding that judge starting each 
day with a prayer “inject[s] religion into the judicial process” 
and “destroy[s] the appearance of neutrality”); id. at 1151 
(“[t]his principle [of government neutrality toward religion] 
applies with even greater force to the judicial branch because 
judges are sworn to be neutral arbiters and must apply the law 
even-handedly without letting bias or personal feeling enter into 
the decision”) (internal citation omitted). 
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a three-level reduction for acceptance”), also 
contributed to the coercion by going beyond merely 
explaining the effect of criminal history categories, 
and instead making statements which suggested 
Davila would be worse off if he proceeded to trial.     
Such judicial comments urging a plea and 
cooperation are inherently coercive, and violate 
canons, rules, and standards of judicial ethics.  In 
addition, and irrespective of whether the magistrate 
judge’s comments actually influenced Davila to plead 
guilty here, such judicial exhortations to plead guilty 
not only fundamentally impair the voluntariness of a 
plea and an individual defendant’s rights to a fair 
process, but also undermine the integrity of the 
judiciary and the criminal justice system. 
Judicial conduct that encourages a guilty plea has 
long been understood to undermine the voluntariness 
of the plea and a defendant’s constitutional right to 
be heard.  See Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 
293, 295 (10th Cir. 1957) (“A plea of guilty interposed 
as the result of coercion is not consistent with due 
process and therefore a judgment and sentence 
imposed pursuant to such a plea cannot stand.”); 
Tateo, 214 F. Supp. at 565 (“A conviction which rests 
upon a coerced plea of guilty, no less than one which 
rests upon a coerced confession, is inconsistent with 
due process of law.”).  The “overbearing force” of 
statements from the court have “a subtle but 
nonetheless powerful influence upon the defendant” 
that “can hardly be questioned.”  Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 
at 566; see also United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 
1141 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Indeed, the pressure inherent 
in judicial participation would seem to be reason 
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enough to reverse a conviction when the defendant 
accedes to the plea suggested by the district court.”)  
Consistent with this, judicial standards of conduct 
recognize that a judge “should not through word or 
demeanor, either directly or indirectly, communicate 
to the defendant or defense counsel that a plea 
agreement should be accepted or that a guilty plea 
should be entered.”  ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice:  Pleas of Guilty § 14–3.3(c) (3d ed. 1999) 
(“Criminal Justice Standards”); see also ABA Model 
Rules of Judicial Conduct R. 2.6(B) (2011) (“ABA 
Model Rules”) (“[a] judge . . . shall not act in a 
manner that coerces any party into settlement”); 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 3 
commentary to Canon 3A(4) (2011) (“Canons”) (“[a] 
judge may encourage and seek to facilitate settlement 
but should not act in a manner that coerces any party 
into surrendering the right to have the controversy 
resolved by the court.”).4  
                                                 
3   Georgia has adopted its own code of judicial conduct 
similar to the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges.  
See Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (2004); see id. at  
commentary to Canon 3B(8) (“Judges should encourage and 
seek to facilitate settlement, but parties should not feel coerced 
into surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved by 
courts.”).  
4  By prohibiting judges from participating in plea 
negotiations, Rule 11(c)(1) aims to eliminate the opportunity for 
a judge to overstep its bounds or be a partisan participant in 
negotiations.  See United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460 
(4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Cannady, 283 F.3d 
641, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted) (the 
prohibition of judicial participation in plea negotiations:  (i) 
“diminishes the possibility of judicial coercion of a guilty plea” 
(ii) “protects against unfairness and partiality in the judicial 
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In addition, coercive judicial participation in plea 
negotiations undermines the integrity of, and public 
confidence in, the judiciary and the fair 
administration of justice.  The goal of judicial ethics, 
as crystallized in various canons, codes, and rules 
governing the judiciary, is to promote the integrity of 
the judicial process including by avoiding the 
appearance that the members of the judiciary are 
partisan participants in the process.  See James J. 
Alfini, et al., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.03 
(4th ed. 2007); see also Canon 1 (“A judge shall 
uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and 
impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety”) and 
ABA Model R. 1.2 (“A judge shall act at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the 
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety”); id. cmt. [5] (“The test for 
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct 
would create in reasonable minds a perception that 
the judge violated this Code or engaged in other 
conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s 
honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to 
serve as a judge”); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009) (in judicial disqualification 
 
(continued…) 
 
process”  and  (iii) “eliminates the misleading impression that 
the judge is an advocate for the agreement rather than a neutral 
arbiter”)); see also United States v. Bierd, 217 F.3d 15, 18-19 
(1st Cir. 2000) (same); Miles, 10 F.3d at 1139; United States v. 
Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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context, “objective standards may also require recusal 
whether or not actual bias exists or can be proved.  
Due process ‘may sometimes bar trial by judges who 
have no actual bias and who would do their very best 
to weigh the scales of justice equally between 
contending parties.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).   
The fact that the magistrate judge’s commentary 
was provided in an ex parte setting, outside of the 
presence of the Government, could contribute to the 
impression that the judge was Davila’s trusted 
counselor.  See ABA Model R. 2.6, cmt. [2] (“The 
judge should keep in mind the effect that the judge’s 
participation in settlement discussions may have, not 
only on the judge’s own views of the case, but also on 
the perceptions of the lawyers and the parties. . . .”).  
Someone in Davila’s shoes reasonably could conclude 
that the facts of the matter were decided and Davila’s 
best option, in the court’s estimation, was to plead 
guilty. 
B. Outside Of,  And  Regardless  Of,  Rule 11, 
State  And  Federal  Courts  Proscribe  Judicial 
Exhortations  To  Plead  Guilty  Or  Cooperate. 
Wholly apart from the requirements of Rule 11, 
federal and state courts have recognized that besides 
violating professional norms for judges, judicial 
exhortations to plead guilty and cooperate also 
violate court-established standards that federal and 
state courts apply to vacate guilty pleas where the 
record shows coercive judicial participation that 
implicates concerns about due process of law and a 
fair and neutral judiciary.  Federal and state courts 
may exercise supervisory authority to proscribe such 
judicial conduct, regardless of Rule 11.  Indeed, if 
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there had been no proposed plea agreement on the 
table, and no plea discussions ongoing—such that the 
magistrate judge’s comments could not have been 
part of “these discussions” addressed in Rule 
11(c)(1)—the comments still would have been 
improper. 
Even in jurisdictions which have not adopted a 
rule of procedure analogous to Rule 11 in prohibiting 
all judicial participation in plea negotiations, it is 
well recognized that judicial exhortations to plead 
guilty or cooperate so impair individual rights and 
the judicial process that they may require that a plea 
be vacated.   See, e.g., State v. Bouie, 817 So. 2d 48, 
56 (La. 2002); Standley v. Warden, 990 P.2d 783, 785 
(Nev. 1999); People v. Sandoval, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 911, 
922 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Weaver, 12 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 742, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing 
the “great risks in the trial court involving itself in 
the plea negotiation process” and that as 
“involvement increases in intensity, the risks become 
greater”); see also Bruce, 976 F.2d at 556 (“[J]udicial 
involvement in plea negotiations inevitably carries 
with it the high and unacceptable risk of coercing a 
defendant to accept the proposed agreement and 
plead guilty.”) (citing United States v. Werker, 535 
F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1976)).5 
                                                 
5 Many of these state court cases cite federal authority from 
the Rule 11 context in connection with the rationale against 
judicial participation in plea negotiations.  See, e.g., Weaver, 12 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 147 (citing Miles, 10 F.3d at 1139; Bruce, 976 
F.2d at 556; and Prohibition of Federal Judge’s Participation in 
Plea Bargaining Negotiations Under Rule 11(e) of Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, (2000), 161 A.L.R. Fed. 537, 2000 WL 
376140) as well as Criminal Justice Standard § 14–3.3(c)).  
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This includes in situations like this one, where a 
judge effectively “counsels” a defendant to plead 
guilty.  See, e.g., Standley, 990 P.2d at 785 (“[t]he 
judge thereby adopted the role of counselor to a 
criminal defendant, foregoing his duty as a neutral 
arbiter of the criminal prosecution.”) (internal 
quotations omitted);6 Weaver, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 149 
(“The judicial change of ‘hats’ in this case is head 
spinning.  At any given time he seemed to fill the role 
of judge, jury, defense counsel, prosecutor, 
psychiatrist, social worker and victims’ advocate. 
While in some objective sense it may be that the 
judge, a person of long experience, did know what 
was best for everyone, that is beside the point.”). 
These courts recognize that a “lengthy exposition” 
by a judge espousing the virtues of a plea or 
cooperation, or the risks of going to trial, may 
inappropriately “effectively convince[]” a defendant to 
accept a plea agreement.  Standley, 990 P.2d at 785.  
These decisions recognize that—outside of Rule 
11(c)(1)’s absolute prohibition against judicial 
participation in plea negotiations—there is a line 
that judges may not cross between acceptable judicial 
involvement and unacceptable coercion.  See Bouie, 
817 So. 2d at 56 (recognizing that “a fine line may at 
times separate a trial judge’s attempts to insure that 
the defendant understands that a guilty plea might 
                                                 
6  The Nevada Supreme Court later adopted a bright-line 
prohibition against judicial participation akin to Rule 11, 
finding that “the inherent and unacceptable risks involved in 
judicial participation in the plea process” could not be 
sufficiently mitigated by the approach in Standley.  Cripps v. 
State, 137 P.3d 1187, 1191 (Nev. 2006).  
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serve his best interest and the overbearing of a 
defendant’s will to reach a result the court, with the 
best of intentions, deems appropriate”); Standley, 990 
P.2d at 785 (recognizing that it is not necessarily 
improper for a judge to “facilitate the plea 
negotiations or make an isolated comment about the 
plea offer”).   
For example, in Bouie, a trial judge’s explanations 
of the possible outcomes the defendant faced at trial, 
that the judge had discretion to impose harsher 
penalties in the event of a conviction than for a plea 
bargain, and of the legal principles underlying a 
verdict “were not inherently coercive because the 
advice concerned information that an accused ought 
to possess to enter a knowing and intelligent guilty 
plea.”  Bouie, 817 So. 2d at 55.  However, after 
properly assuring that the defendant was aware of 
the terms of the plea, when the judge continued, 
plying the defendant “with his personal view that the 
result of a jury trial was all but a foregone 
conclusion, he went beyond simply facilitating the 
entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.”  Id.  
Just as in Standley, the judge’s repeated references 
in Bouie to his time as a prosecutor—“I don't think 
I've ever seen more than one or two people who went 
to trial found not guilty”—crossed the line from 
neutral arbiter to “advocate.”  817 So. 2d at 56; see 
also id. at 50.  Similarly here, the record of the ex 
parte hearing shows the magistrate judge crossing 
the line from neutral arbiter to partisan or judicial 
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“advocate,” urging a particular course of conduct to 
the defendant.7 
At the heart of these decisions, even in 
jurisdictions that allow some judicial involvement in 
plea negotiations, is the recognition that judicial 
participation in plea negotiations carries with it great 
risk of exerting undue influence, and coercive judicial 
involvement is forbidden and requires vacating the 
plea.  A judge may ensure that a plea is voluntarily 
and knowingly made, but it is something else entirely 
when he “brings to bear the full force and majesty of 
[the judicial] office” to effect an outcome he prefers.   
United States v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also Standley, 990 P.2d at 785 
(finding improper judicial participation where “[i]n 
commenting on the offer, the judge evinced an 
unmistakable desire that appellant accept the offer” 
and that only where coercion is present “will we 
consider affording a defendant an opportunity to 
withdraw his or her plea”).   
                                                 
7 See also Resp. Br. at 21-24 & n.1 (discussing cases and 
commentary before, or outside of, Rule 11(c)(1)’s bright-line 
prohibition against judicial participation). 
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II. APPELLATE COURTS CAN VACATE A GUILTY 
PLEA  WITHOUT  REMANDING  FOR 
ADDITIONAL INQUIRY  WHEN  THE  RECORD, 
AS  HERE,  SHOWS  INHERENTLY 
PREJUDICIAL  JUDICIAL  CONDUCT. 
A. The  Eleventh  Circuit  May  Exercise 
Supervisory   Authority  Over  The   
Administration  of  Justice To  Vacate The Plea, 
And A Federal Appellate Court’s Supervisory 
Authority Is At Its Zenith When Exercised 
Over The Conduct Of Lower Court Judges.  
This Court may affirm as a proper exercise of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s “supervisory authority over the 
administration of criminal justice in the federal 
courts.”   See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 
(1954) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 
332 (1943) (superseded by statute)); Thomas v. Arn, 
474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985). 8   A federal court may 
formulate and apply procedural rules not specifically 
required by the Constitution or Congress, so long as 
doing so does not conflict with constitutional or 
statutory provisions.  Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 
                                                 
8 One underpinning for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is the 
proper exercise of its supervisory authority.  See Davila, 664 
F.3d at 1358 (citing United States v. Diaz, 138 F.3d 1359, 1362 
(11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “[a] violation of Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 11[] is plain error and, pursuant to its supervisory power over 
the district courts, the court of appeals may raise such a 
violation sua sponte and order a resentencing of a defendant 
who pleads not guilty and demonstrates no actual prejudice in 
his trial or sentence.”)) (citing United States v. Adams, 634 F.3d 
830, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1981)).  The Government addresses 
supervisory authority in recognition that it may be a basis for 
affirming the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.  See Pet. Br. at 16-20. 
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States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (citing United States 
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)); Thomas, 474 
U.S. at 148).  Here, the Eleventh Circuit enforced a 
well recognized prohibition against a trial judge 
urging a guilty plea or cooperation that is consistent, 
and does not conflict, with relevant constitutional 
and statutory provisions.  
Indeed, “[t]his [supervisory] power rests on the 
firmest ground when used to establish rules of 
judicial procedure.”  Thomas, 474 U.S. at 146-47 n.5 
(citing Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory 
Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and 
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal 
Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1465 (1984)); id. at 
146-47 (“It cannot be doubted that the courts of 
appeals have supervisory powers that permit, at the 
least, the promulgation of procedural rules governing 
the management of litigation. . . .  Indeed, this Court 
has acknowledged the power of the courts of appeals 
to mandate ‘procedures deemed desirable from the 
viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in 
nowise commanded by statute or by the 
Constitution.’”) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 346 n.10 (1980); quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 
U.S. 141, 146 (1973)) (internal citations omitted).  
Moreover, there is no separation of powers concern 
when the supervisory authority is exercised over the 
judiciary, rather than another branch of Government.  
The Constitution permits “[t]he judicial power of the 
United States,” Art. III, § 1, to be vested in federal 
courts and exercised by federal judges by virtue of 
their Article III commissions. 
A federal appellate court’s ability to exercise its 
supervisory authority is at its zenith when 
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proscribing inherently prejudicial conduct by a 
federal district or magistrate judge that interferes 
with the fair administration of justice—and this 
includes conduct such as the magistrate judge’s 
comments evidenced by the record here urging a 
guilty plea and cooperation.  See Offutt, 348 U.S. at 
17 (reversing contempt finding based on supervisory 
authority where judge “instead of representing the 
impersonal authority of law” “permitted himself to 
become personally embroiled” in a way that 
“precluded that atmosphere of austerity which should 
especially dominate a criminal trial and which is 
indispensable for an appropriate sense of 
responsibility on the part of court, counsel and jury”); 
id. at 18 (“To sanction such a course of procedure 
would give it encouragement”); see also Marshall v. 
United States,  360 U.S. 310, 310-11 (1959) (granting 
a new trial based on the exercise of supervisory 
powers “to formulate and apply proper standards for 
enforcement of the criminal law in the federal courts” 
despite broad discretion afforded to the trial court to 
assess prejudice from jurors’ exposure to news 
articles).   
Courts exercise supervisory authority not just to 
protect individual rights, but also to protect judicial 
integrity and to promote public confidence in the just 
administration of criminal justice.  In Ballard v. 
United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)—a  case decided 
well before Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), 
and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 
(1994)—this Court “conclude[d] that the purposeful 
and systematic exclusion of women from the [jury] 
panel” authorized the Court to “exercise our power of 
supervision over the administration of justice in the 
federal courts . . . to correct an error which 
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permeated this proceeding.”  Id. at 193.  “[R]eversible 
error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an 
individual case”; where the “evil” lies in the exclusion 
of a particular class “[t]he injury is not limited to the 
defendant—there is injury to the jury system, to the 
law as an institution, to the community at large, and 
to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of 
our courts.”  Id. at 195.  So too here.  The injury is not 
limited to undermining the voluntariness of Davila’s 
plea and his right to a fair and impartial process, but 
also impacts public confidence in the judiciary and 
the fair administration of justice. 
The United States gives any “supervisory 
authority” argument that may be underpinning the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision short shrift.  See Pet. Br. 
at 16-20.  Nothing in this Court’s prior decisions, or 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(h) and 52, 
however, eliminates a federal court’s ability to 
exercise supervisory authority to proscribe federal 
judicial conduct that is inherently prejudicial like the 
magistrate judge’s exhortations to plead guilty and 
cooperate illustrated on the record here. 
The Government relies on Bank of Nova Scotia, 
487 U.S. 250.  See Pet. Br. at 18-19.  In that case, the 
Court addressed whether prosecutorial misconduct in 
grand jury proceedings warranted dismissal of an 
indictment absent any showing of prejudice.  487 U.S. 
at 252.  That situation is far different from a judicial 
officer urging a defendant to plead guilty and 
cooperate and waive the right to trial and other 
important rights.  Indeed, in Bank of Nova Scotia, 
this Court addressed the distinction between errors 
that may or may not be prejudicial, on the one hand, 
and those that are inherently prejudicial, on the 
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other hand.  The Court recognized that the rule 
applied in that case would not apply where “[t]he 
nature of the violation allow[s] a presumption that 
the defendant was prejudiced, and any inquiry into 
harmless error would require unguided speculation.”  
Id. at 257.  While a federal court may not invoke 
supervisory power to circumvent the harmless error 
inquiry in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 in 
that context, id. at 254-55, the holding in Bank of 
Nova Scotia  would not apply to “fundamental” errors 
or where “structural protections” were “so 
compromised as to render the proceedings 
fundamentally unfair, allowing the presumption of 
prejudice.”  Id. at 256-57.  Here a presumption of 
prejudice is appropriate given the nature of the 
magistrate judge’s coercive comments and his 
departure from the neutral judicial role.  
As the Respondent’s brief illustrates, in enacting 
Rule 11(h) Congress did not mean to preclude the 
exercise of supervisory authority in a case like this 
one where the Rule 11 violation is accompanied by 
inherently prejudicial judicial conduct urging a plea 
and cooperation.  See Resp. Br. at 13, 24-30.  In 
addition, the record here illustrates judicial conduct 
that is not just a technical judicial error or a Rule 
11(c)(1) error.  Even in the Rule 11 context, as 
Respondent argues, Resp. Br. at 50-51, 24-30, this 
error is different in kind from the technical Rule 11 
errors that this Court previously considered in 
Dominguez Benitez, Vonn, and even McCarthy.   See 
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 
(2004) (unobjected-to error in guilty plea colloquy did 
not warrant vacatur); United States v. Vonn, 535 
U.S. 55 (2002) (same); McCarthy v. United States, 
394 U.S. 464 (1969) (vacating guilty plea where 
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district court accepted guilty plea without personally 
addressing defendant to ensure that he understood 
the nature of the charges); see also United States v. 
Baker, 489 F.3d 366, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[N]ot all 
Rule 11 violations are created equal.”).  The United 
States, however, urges a result that would paint all 
Rule 11 violations with the same broad brush and 
preclude the exercise of supervisory authority to 
proscribe judicial misconduct far more prejudicial 
than a Rule 11 violation.  
B. No Additional Inquiry Into Actual Prejudice Is 
Required Or Advisable Where,  As Here,  The 
Record Is Clear That Coercive Conduct 
Occurred And The Magistrate Judge Departed 
From The Neutral Judicial Role.   
 When a judicial officer, as in this case, abandons 
all pretense of neutrality, a further inquiry, after the 
fact, as to whether a judge’s comments actually 
influenced a defendant to plead guilty belies the 
serious and damaging nature of the conduct at issue.  
For that reason, courts within and outside of the Rule 
11 context consistently vacate pleas without 
remanding for additional inquiry into prejudice 
where the record is clear that coercive judicial 
conduct preceded a guilty plea and was not corrected.  
See, e.g., Bruce, 976 F.2d at 561 (vacating plea 
without remanding for inquiry into prejudice in Rule 
11 context in light of judicial involvement in plea 
negotiations); Miles, 10 F.3d at 1142 (same); Tateo, 
214 F. Supp. at 568 (vacating plea without 
remanding for inquiry into prejudice in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 context in light of coercive judicial conduct); 
Euziere, 249 F.2d at 295 (same); Weaver, 12 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 757 (reversing denial of appellant's 
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motion to withdraw his plea without remanding for 
inquiry into prejudice outside of the Rule 11 context); 
Bouie, 817 So. 2d at 56 (concluding, without 
remanding for inquiry into prejudice and outside of 
the Rule 11 context, “that the defendant’s guilty plea 
under these circumstances was not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered, such that the district court 
abused its discretion in not granting the defendant’s 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea.”).  No subsequent 
inquiry into actual prejudice is required.9   
This is true whether or not such conduct also 
happens to constitute a violation of Rule 11(c)(1).10  
                                                 
9 Ethics Amici have identified two less recent cases where 
state courts addressed some level of judicial encouragement to 
plead guilty and did not vacate the plea.  Even in those cases, 
which are not dispositive here, the appellate courts ruled 
without remanding for further inquiry.  See People v. Davis, 54 
A.D.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (determining without 
remanding that, based on the record there, vacatur was not 
warranted where defendant pled guilty on the eve of trial when 
faced with overwhelming evidence after conclusion of a 
suppression hearing, and not immediately after the judge urged 
him to do so); People v. Earegood, 173 N.W.2d 205 (Mich. 1970) 
(finding vacatur was not warranted, but remanding for re-
sentencing, where judge warned defendant of the consequences 
of delay in entering a guilty plea and its affect on sentencing, 
and defendant later entered guilty plea).  
10  Ethics Amici submit that the Eleventh Circuit had 
supervisory authority to vacate on this record without a further 
inquiry into actual prejudice regardless of whether the conduct 
also violated Rule 11(c)(1).  This position, however, also accords 
with Rule 11 concepts.  Couched in the language of Rule 11, if 
plain error is the standard, the Court may hold, like the 
Eleventh Circuit, that the plain error standard is necessarily 
met because coercive  judicial  participation  such  as  the  
record shows here  “seriously affect[s]  the  fairness,  integrity  
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As Respondent argues, an inquiry into the 
defendant’s reasons for pleading guilty—and  
whether the magistrate judge’s conduct was 
determinative and actually coerced Davila to plead 
guilty—would be unduly burdensome, intrusive and 
speculative.  See Resp. Br. at 30-50.  
More fundamentally, where a judge urges a guilty 
plea or cooperation, as occurred here, the plea should 
be vacated because the comments are damaging and 
inherently prejudicial to the individual defendant as 
well as to the judiciary and public confidence in the 
fair administration of justice.  No additional inquiry 
is necessary, and no showing of actual coercion or 
prejudice is required, where the record is sufficient, 
as here, to show such improper judicial exhortation to 
plead guilty and cooperate occurred.   
Remanding for additional inquiry into prejudice is 
unnecessary.  Reversing the Eleventh Circuit sends 
the wrong message to the judiciary and to the public, 
as well as fails to pay due regard to the trial court’s 
obligation to ensure, not undermine, the 
 
(continued…) 
 
or  public reputation of judicial proceedings,”  Vonn, 535 U.S. at 
62-63 (internal citations and quotations omitted), without a 
showing of individualized prejudice.  See Davila, 664 F.3d 1355.  
In the alternative, the Court could hold that the plain error 
standard does not apply, see Baker, 489 F.3d at 372-73, to such 
a fundamental and non-technical breach of Rule 11(c).  See Resp. 
Br. at 31-34 (addressing errors that qualify for correction 
without a specific showing of prejudice); id. at 21-24, 50, 51-54 
(distinguishing judicial exhortation errors from technical 
violations of Rule 11 and arguing that the plain error standard 
should not apply). 
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voluntariness of a guilty plea and the fairness of 
criminal proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit should be 
affirmed.           
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 APPENDIX:  List Of Amici Curiae 
Bruce Green is the Louis Stein Professor and 
Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics 
at Fordham University School of Law. 
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at 
Fordham University School of Law examines the 
critical role of lawyers in building a more just society, 
and explores how ethical values inform and improve 
the legal profession. The Stein Center supports a 
wide range of conferences, publications and 
independent research.   
James J. Alfini is Dean Emeritus and Professor of 
Law at South Texas College of Law. 
Mark I. Harrison is a Partner at Osborn Maledon, 
P.A., Phoenix, Arizona and Former Chair, ABA 
Commission to Revise the Code of Judicial Conduct 
(2004-2007). 
Renee Newman Knake is an Associate Professor 
of Law at Michigan State University College of Law, 
and co-director of the Kelley Institute of Ethics and 
the Legal Profession. 
Lisa G. Lerman is a Professor of Law and 
Coordinator of Clinical Programs at The Catholic 
University of America. 
Peter Margulies is a Professor of Law at Roger 
Williams University School of Law. 
Daniel S. Medwed is a Professor of Law at 
Northeastern University School of Law. 
Judith L. Maute is the William J. Alley Professor 
of Law at University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
New York Law School Center for Professional 
Values and Practice focuses on the changing 
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conditions of law practice in the U.S. and abroad. 
Through classwork, case studies, Center events, and 
independent projects, students learn about the 
conditions of practice in a variety of settings.  The 
goal of the Center is to provide students with a 
sophisticated understanding about the conditions of 
modern law practice and to equip students for 
successful careers in the next generation of practice 
organizations. 
University of Miami School of Law's Center for 
Ethics & Public Service, founded in 1996, is an 
interdisciplinary program devoted to the values of 
ethical judgment, professional responsibility, and 
public service in law and society. 
Richard W. Painter is a Professor of Law at the 
University of Minnesota Law School.  
John P. Sahl is a Professor of Law and Faculty 
Director of the Miller-Becker Center for Professional 
Responsibility. 
The Joseph G. Miller and William C. Becker 
Center for Professional Responsibility at University 
of Akron Law School was founded in 1993 as the 
Joseph G. Miller Institute for Professional 
Responsibility and rededicated in 2003 as the Joseph 
G. Miller and William C. Becker Center for 
Professional Responsibility.   The Center is involved 
in lectures, presentations, conferences, and symposia 
that focus on lawyer and judicial ethics and 
professional responsibility. 
Ellen Yaroshefsky is a Clinical Professor of Law 
and Director of the Jacob Burns Ethics Center in the 
Practice of Law at Cardozo School of Law. 
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The Jacob Burns Center for Ethics in the Practice 
of Law sponsors courses, programs, and events that 
provoke dialogue and critical thought on ethical and 
moral issues of professional responsibility.  The 
Center helps prepare students to face with integrity 
the difficult and important questions that arise in all 
areas of legal practice. 
